Authoritative Judgments and Legislative Autonomy: The Conflict Between the Constitutional Court and Congress in Peru

Abstract

This article examines the limited effectiveness of exhortatory judgments issued by the Constitutional Court of Peru and emphasizes the tension between the function of constitutional review and the legislative autonomy of Congress. Although such judgments are not legally binding, their purpose is to guide the legislature in adapting the legal provisions under review to constitutional values, particularly when defects of unconstitutionality are identified. However, their noncompliance cannot be explained solely by the absence of formal binding force, but also by the perception that they interfere with the legislative agenda, even in cases involving fundamental rights.

Through the study of emblematic cases in Peru and an analysis of the treatment of this issue in comparative law in countries such as Argentina, Colombia, Chile, and Guatemala, the article demonstrates that this problem is not exclusive to the national context. Nevertheless, in Peru it has acquired particular relevance due to the fragility of institutional dialogue mechanisms.

The article concludes that the failure to heed exhortatory judgments is fundamentally the result of a structural tension between the principle of separation of powers and the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction, rather than merely a lack of political will. In this regard, it is argued that the effectiveness of such decisions depends on the Constitutional Court exercising its exhortatory function under criteria of judicial self-restraint and the formulation of general standards of constitutionality, so that exhortations operate as instruments of legislative guidance rather than as factors that deepen interinstitutional conflict.